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Audit Committee Composition and Effectiveness: A Review of Post-SOX Literature

Abstract:
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted to strengthen corporate governance
practices in the United States; since SOX enactment, the audit committee has received increasing
emphasis in accounting research. The objective of this study is to review and synthesize the
growing volume of audit committee literature in the post-SOX era. While summarizing the postSOX literature, this study also focuses on selected pre-SOX studies to compare the research
issues and findings of pre- and post-SOX literature and to show how governance reforms shape
the literature’s domain. The extant audit committee literature reflects an enormous body of
knowledge. Both the pre- and post-SOX literature establishes the notion that independent and
expert audit committees enhance the effectiveness of audit committee monitoring processes and
improve the quality of financial reporting and auditing. These findings supplement the scholarly
support for SOX requirements. In the post-SOX era, researchers have focused on issues driven
by SOX. However, other issues that are not addressed in SOX have also emerged, including
audit committee compensation and committee members’ social ties with the chief executive
officer and supervisory or other expertize of the audit committee members. While the literature
contains predominantly experimental research, there is ample room for future research that can
shed light on more theoretical issues. Future researchers can investigate unanswered questions by
establishing an implicit understanding of existing findings and developing theories in this area.
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1.0 Introduction
In response to major financial scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was
enacted to strengthen corporate governance systems to protect shareholders from fraudulent
accounting practices. SOX enhances the power and responsibility of audit committees, which
play a crucial role in ensuring reliable financial reporting, internal controls, external auditing,
and risk management through their diligent oversight efforts. Shortly after SOX was enacted,
researchers began to investigate the effectiveness of its requirements regarding audit committee
composition and monitoring processes. This study provides a thorough review of the post-SOX
audit committee literature that uses exclusively post-SOX data and investigates the effectiveness
of SOX with regard to audit committee monitoring processes. While summarizing the post-SOX
research, this study also focuses on selected pre-SOX studies to compare the trends and findings
in the pre- and post-SOX audit committee literature.
Post-SOX audit committee literature has addressed several aspects of audit committees
and their impact on oversight processes. Even in the pre-SOX era, the issue of audit committee
effectiveness received enormous importance in the accounting literature. Before 2002, legislators
and regulators also emphasized the need to improve audit committee effectiveness by issuing, for
example, the Blue Ribbon Committee Report of 1999, Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) disclosure rules 1999b, and the 2000 National Association of Corporate Directors
(NACD) report on audit committees. Thus, the issue of audit committee effectiveness has been
important in both the pre- and post-SOX eras.
Based on the time line, in this study I have classified the audit committee-related research
to date into two groups: (1) pre-SOX literature, which includes papers published before 2002 and
papers published after 2002 using data from before 2002 and (2) post-SOX literature, which uses
2

exclusively post-SOX data (data from after 2002). The classification was based on interest in
determining how SOX requirements have affected the trends and findings in audit committee
research. Exhibit 1 shows the time line classification of the audit committee literature.
[Insert Exhibit 1]
This study has three objectives. First is to summarize the audit committee-related
research and provide an overview of the principal findings of post-SOX researchers that used
exclusively data from after 2002. This will help future researchers establish a precise
understanding of what has already been investigated. The second objective is to compare preand post-SOX research trends and findings. This comparison will help in understanding how
SOX has influenced the path of scholarly investigation. The third objective is to identify the gaps
and inconsistencies in the existing literature, which will help in identifying promising
opportunities for future research. Thus, this paper will contribute by evaluating existing theories
and findings in audit committee-related research in the post-SOX era.
The post-SOX literature presents substantial evidence that SOX requirements play a
significant role in enhancing audit committees’ quality, power, and effectiveness. The thrust of
this research is the theory that firms can improve financial reporting, audit quality, and internal
control by complying with audit committee-related SOX requirements. The studies reviewed
within this paper were based on empirical, analytical, and experimental research conducted after
2002. To assess the post-SOX audit committee research, this review focused on studies
published in top-ranked mainstream accounting and auditing journals: The Accounting Review
(TAR), Journal of Accounting Research (JAR), Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE),
Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR), Review of Accounting Studies (RAST), Journal of
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Accounting and Public Policy (JAPP), Accounting, Organizations, and Society (AOS), and
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (AJPT). The keyword ‘audit committee’ was used to
search for relevant studies. As part of the article search for this review, titles and/or abstracts of
articles found in these journals were carefully examined for relevant research. Unpublished
working papers were not included in the review. However, two conference papers were included
for two reasons. First, the research issues discussed in those papers are directly relevant to audit
committee-related SOX requirements. Second, these papers are the continuation or part of a
series of other papers discussed in this study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses audit committeerelated sections in SOX. In section 3, the domain and a classification of audit committee research
in relation to SOX is discussed. Section 4.1 provides a summary of the post-SOX literature that
focuses on audit committee effectiveness and external auditing. Section 4.2 focuses on the
financial reporting process. Section 4.3 highlights earning management issues and section 4.4
reviews audit committee studies that focused on internal control deficiencies. Section 4.5
provides a summary of other issues, including litigation risks, market reaction, and the audit
committee oversight process. Finally, section 4 provides concluding remarks and directions for
future research.
2.0 The Audit Committee and SOX
The audit committee has been defined in several ways in several contexts. In Sec. 2, SOX
offers the following definition:
“The term ‘audit committee’ means a committee (or equivalent body) established by and
amongst the board of directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and
4

financial reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer;
and if no such committee exists with respect to an issuer, the entire board of directors of the
issuer.”
In light of this definition, it is obvious that the ultimate goal of the audit committee is to
ensure financial reporting quality and independent external auditing. Audit committee
composition (expertise, independence, integrity, objectivity) and other characteristics (welldefined responsibilities, access to management, incentives) of audit committees are the most
significant issues related to achieving this goal.
The SEC requires all public companies to maintain a standing audit committee that is
responsible for carrying out its duties in the manner prescribed by SOX. Under section 301 of
SOX, each audit committee of a listed company is to be “directly responsible for the
appointment, compensation, and oversight” of the outside auditor, and the auditors are to report
directly to the audit committee. Section 301(3) also emphasizes independence of the audit
committee. According to SOX, each member of the audit committee should be independent. To
be independent, an audit committee member should not “accept any consulting, advisory, or
other compensatory fee” from the firm.
Section 407 of SOX requires all public companies to disclose the financial expertise of
audit committee members. In defining “financial expert,” the act considers a member’s
qualifications through his or her “education and experience as a public accountant or auditor or a
principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting officer.” An “understanding of
generally accepted accounting principles, and experience in preparing or auditing of financial
statements” can also be considered “financial expertise” according to the act.

5

3.0 The Domain of Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature
To organize the literature review, I classify the area of post-SOX audit committee
research into five main domains: external auditing, financial reporting process, internal control
deficiencies, earnings management, and other studies. Exhibit 2 provides a simplified
classification of the domain of post-SOX audit committee literature. Most researchers have
investigated the impacts of audit committee composition criteria and the effectiveness of
financial reporting and auditing quality. Overall, the post-SOX literature establishes the notion
that independent and expert audit committees help in reducing earnings management and internal
control deficiencies and improve financial reporting and audit quality. These findings
supplement the significance and implications of SOX. Researchers have also documented a
causal link between audit committee compensation and financial reporting quality, as well as
audit committee expertise and positive stock price reaction.
[Insert Exhibit 2]
SOX emphasizes the authority and responsibility of audit committees in monitoring
external auditors. Post-SOX audit committee research has mainly focused on audit committee
composition criteria (e.g., independence, expertise, multiple directorships, compensation) and
their impact on internal and external auditing quality. The issues addressed in this area include
auditor-client negotiation, audit fees, non-audit services provided by external auditors, and
auditors’ restatement recommendations, among others. Audit committee members should
understand the financial reporting process since the committee’s main responsibility is to ensure
the integrity of the company’s financial reporting. SOX requires that audit committee members
have financial and accounting expertise and independence. Therefore, post-SOX literature has
investigated the independence and expertise of the audit committee and its impact on financial
6

reporting quality. Earnings management and internal control deficiencies are two other important
areas addressed in the post-SOX audit committee literature. Using post-SOX data, researchers
have investigated how audit committee composition criteria (especially independence and
expertise) are associated with firms’ earning management practices and internal control
problems. The post-SOX audit committee literature also highlights other issues, such as audit
committee expertise and market reaction, audit committee oversight processes, and audit
committee criteria and litigation risk.
[Insert Exhibit 3]
Exhibit 3 illustrates the domain of post-SOX audit committee literature. As defined by
SOX, the main responsibility of the audit committee is to monitor the auditor and the
management of the company. To ensure an effective monitoring process, SOX focuses on the
criteria for composition (especially independence), which can be considered the ‘determinants’
or ‘input’ of an effective monitoring process. Though the issue of audit committee compensation
is not addressed in SOX, an incentive policy plays an important role in audit committees’
monitoring processes. The post-SOX literature documents how cash or stock-based
compensation is associated with the audit committee oversight process. The audit committee
serves as the watchdog to protect shareholders’ interests from any opportunistic behavior of
management or auditors. The ‘effectiveness’ or ‘output’ of the audit committees’ oversight
process can be judged by examining whether firms have independent audit reports and quality
financial reporting or whether they practice earnings management or have internal control
problems. The post-SOX audit committee literature delineates both the ‘input’ (determinants)
and ‘output’ (effectiveness) of the audit committee monitoring process.
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Although most of the issues discussed in the post-SOX literature are also addressed in the
pre-SOX era, in some cases the findings and interpretations differ. For example, using pre-SOX
data, DeZoort et al. (2003) documented that audit committee members’ support for the auditor in
a dispute with management was often contingent on contextual factors such as whether the
financial statement adjustment was related to an annual or quarterly report. However, after SOX,
DeZoort et al. (2008) replicated their pre-SOX study and found that audit committee members
who are certified public accountants (CPAs) (accounting expertise) always support the auditors
in case of auditor management disputes. Thus, the domain of audit committee research is similar
in the pre- and post-SOX eras, but in some cases the findings and implications differ. The area of
post-SOX study is mainly SOX centered and relates to the implications of SOX for audit
committees’ effectiveness. Exhibit 4 lists the post-SOX audit committee studies discussed in this
study. While reviewing these post-SOX studies, I also compared the findings and implications of
selected pre-SOX research that addressed the same issue.
[Insert Exhibit 4]
4.1 External and Internal Auditing
External auditing has received enormous emphasis in both pre- and post-SOX audit
committee research. This emphasis is reasonable since the main purpose of appointing an audit
committee is to oversee the quality and independence of auditing. As mandated by SOX Sec.
202, all auditing and non-auditing services provided by external auditors must be preapproved by
the audit committee. SOX also addresses widespread concerns about auditor appointment. Sec.
301 states that the audit committee is responsible for the appointment, compensation, and
oversight of the work of external auditors employed by the firm. The responsibilities of the audit
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committee also include resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor. The
audit committee is also supposed to obtain written documents that detail the relationship between
the auditor and management. Sec. 204 requires external auditors to report to the audit committees
all accounting policies and alternative treatments of financial information and the treatment
preferred by the auditors.
SOX extends the power and responsibility of the audit committee. However, the role of
the audit committee in monitoring auditors was extensively discussed even before the law’s
enactment. Using pre-SOX data, researchers investigated the link between different auditing
issues and audit committee effectiveness. For example, several researchers have discussed the
complementary role of audit committees in the internal auditing process (Raghunandan et al.,
2001; Goodwin, 2003; Abbott et al., 2007). Although internal auditing was considered important
in pre-SOX literature, post-SOX literature mostly concentrates on external auditing. The reason
for fewer studies on the audit committee and internal auditing in the post-SOX era may be
attributed to SOX highlighting the audit committee’s responsibility to oversee external auditors
only. The other issue extensively discussed in the pre-SOX literature is the association between
audit and non-audit fees and audit committee composition criteria, though the findings are
mixed. For example, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) found a negative association, whereas
Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbott et al. (2003) showed a positive association between audit fees
and audit committees’ independence and expertise. Abbott et al. (2003) found that non-audit fees
are negatively associated with audit committee independence and expertise. A number of preSOX audit committee studies focused on auditor selection, auditor-client negotiation, and auditor
resignation issues (Abbott and Parker, 2000; DeZoort et al., 2003; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001;
Lee et al., 2004; Ng and Tan, 2003; Cohen et al., 2002; Raghunandan and Rama, 2003).
9

Researchers have also shown that audit committee composition criteria have significant impacts
on auditors’ going-concern audit reports (Carcello and Neal, 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2003).
In the post-SOX era, researchers have investigated new issues, such as auditors’
restatement recommendations, audit committee members’ multiple directorships, audit
committees’ compensation, and audit committees’ preapproval decisions for audit and non-audit
services. Since SOX Sec. 202 requires that all audit and non-audit services provided by an
external auditor be pre-approved by the audit committee, the question arises as to what factors
motivate audit committee members to approve auditors’ joint service (audit and non-audit)
provision. In a post-SOX study, Gaynor et al. (2006) investigated whether audit committees
consider the non-audit service effects on audit quality and to what extent the mandated
disclosures affect audit committees’ pre-approval decisions. In their experimental study, the
authors found that audit committee members recommend unaffiliated firms for non-audit
services when they see that joint provisions hamper auditors’ objectivity. They also documented
that audit committees are less likely to approve joint service provisions when public disclosures
are required. The findings of this paper support the contention that audit committees are taking
the pre-approval process very seriously as part of their responsibilities under SOX. As mandated
by SOX Sec. 301, an audit committee member must be a member of the company’s board of
directors and must be independent as defined. In a post-SOX study, Hunton and Rose (2008)
investigated whether members with multiple directorships are more likely to compromise their
independence. Their experimental study found that directors holding multiple directorships are
less likely to accept auditors’ restatement recommendations than directors with a single
directorship. Analysis of post-experiment debriefing revealed that members serving on multiple
boards are less willing to support restatements due to the potential adverse effects on reputation.
10

SOX requires external auditors to report “all critical accounting policies” and “all
alternative treatments of financial information within GAAP [generally accepted accounting
principles] that have been discussed with management” and “the treatment preferred by the
registered public accounting firm” (Sec. 204) to the audit committee. This requirement provides
audit committee members with additional information about the range of potential outcomes of
accounting resolutions. Pomrey (2010) evaluated audit committee members’ investigation of
financial reporting decisions. His post-SOX experimental analysis found that negotiation
knowledge influences audit committee members’ discomfort, but does not increase the extent of
investigations. However, he also documented that audit committee members investigate more
extensively as accounting decisions become increasingly aggressive and committee members
have increased accounting experience. The findings provide support for audit committee
members’ financial expertise and accounting experience having a strong influence on their
ability to investigate significant accounting decisions. Vermeer et al. (2009) examined audit
committees’ effectiveness in auditing for non-profit firms. In their survey, they showed that
external audit fees are positively associated with audit committee independence and expertise.
In an archival study, Engel et al. (2010) investigated the issue of audit committee
compensation. Their data reflected both pre- (2000 to 2001) and post-SOX periods (2002 to
2004). They showed that total compensation for audit committees increased significantly in the
post-SOX era, with notable increases in the cash retainer and meeting fee components. This
increase in compensations reflects the SOX requirement for better monitoring and the demand
for independent and expert committee members. Another post-SOX study that focused on audit
committee compensation and audit committee effectiveness was conducted by Bierstaker et al.
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(2012). The authors found that audit committee members are more likely to support the auditor
in a disagreement when audit committee compensation includes long-term stock options.
As an extension of their previous study (Cohen et al., 2002), Cohen et al. (2010)
conducted an experimental study in the post-SOX era investigating how the interaction between
the external auditor and audit committee affects the firm’s audit process and audit environment.
They reported that relative to the pre-SOX period, there has been a shift in auditor experience in
the post-SOX period. They argued that one potential explanation for this shift is that post-SOX
audit committee members perceive an increased threat of legal liability associated with being on
the committee that necessitates audit committee members taking their monitoring roles much
more seriously. Through their semi-structured interviews, they found that the corporate
governance environment has improved considerably in the post-SOX era with audit committees
that are substantially more active, diligent, knowledgeable, and powerful.
Norman et al. (2011) conducted one of the few post-SOX studies that has focused on
internal auditing and audit committee effectiveness. However, in this study, the authors failed to
find evidence that increased expertise and increases in audit committee members’ perceived
powers cause internal auditors to be less willing to waive misstatements. In another post-SOX
study, Baura et al. (2010) argued that audit committee members’ expertise in auditing and their
firm-specific knowledge may have substitution effects on the investment in internal auditing.
They found that the investment in internal auditing is negatively related to the presence of
auditing experts on the committee and the average tenure of audit committee members, but
positively related to the number of audit committee meetings (a proxy for diligence).
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In theoretical research, Schöndube-Pirchegger and Schöndube (2011) offered a model
that explains the herding equilibrium in which the audit committee ‘‘herds’’ and follows the
auditor’s judgment no matter what its own insights suggest. Their result is maintained even when
audit committee members are held liable for detected failure. However, they added that
performance-based bonus payments induce truthful reporting at least in some cases. In another
post-SOX study, Brown-Liburd and Wright (2011) investigated the potential effect of a past
client relationship and the strength of the audit committee in the auditor negotiation process.
Their findings confirmed the importance of the strength of the audit committee and past client
relationships on auditors’ negotiation planning judgments. Overall, the findings of pre- and postSOX audit committee literature that focused on auditing are reasonably consistent. However,
SOX opens new avenues of research and the findings of these scholarly works reestablish the
need for SOX to increase audit committee effectiveness. Table 1 offers a summary of post-SOX
studies that focused on auditing and audit committee composition and effectiveness.
[Insert Table 1]
4.2 Financial Reporting Process
In Sec. 2, SOX defines the audit committee as a committee established by the board of
directors to oversee the accounting and financial reporting processes of the firm. In Sec. 407,
SOX gives special importance to the financial expertise of audit committee members. The audit
committee serves as the watchdog for shareholders to protect the integrity of a company’s
financial reporting. Both pre- and post-SOX researchers have highlighted the impact of audit
committee effectives on firms’ financial reporting processes. In general, the findings from preSOX studies provide that the audit committee may have underutilized its potential to ensure
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quality reporting. Less experienced and less financially expert committee members in the preSOX era account for this. In the post-SOX period, researchers have considered new issues, such
as Internet financial reporting, social ties with the chief executive officer (CEO), and reporting
quality. A number of pre-SOX studies examined how audit committee expertise improves
financial reporting quality (McDaniel et al., 2002; DeZoort et al., 2003). Krishnan and
Visvanathan (2008) showed that only accounting and financial expertise is associated with
conservative reporting, but this finding does not hold for non-accounting and non-financial
experts. By using pre-SOX data, researchers have also documented how audit committee
independence positively affects the financial reporting process (Abbott et al., 2004; Bronson et
al., 2009; Gendron et al., 2004).
In the post-SOX period, researchers have also investigated the effectiveness of audit
committee expertise and independence on firms’ financial reporting processes. However,
researchers have introduced new issues that could have potential impacts on financial reporting
quality and audit committee effectiveness. For example, Kelton and Yang (2008) examined the
relationship between audit committee criteria and reporting transparency, which is measured by
the level of Internet financial reporting. As compared to traditional, paper-based reporting
disclosures, Internet financial reporting allows companies to disseminate financial information in
a more timely manner to a broader audience. The authors hypothesized that SOX’s enhancement
of audit committee power could also influence firms’ Internet reporting behavior.
SOX’s emphasis on the audit committee’s role suggests an increased need for theory
regarding the impact of audit committee members’ compensation. Magilke et al. (2009)
investigated whether stock-based compensation of audit committee members has any impact on
firms’ financial reporting process. Their experiments showed that audit committee members
14

prefer biased reporting when receiving stock-based compensation. They also found that audit
committee members who do not receive stock-based compensation are the most objective;
however, this finding differs from the findings of pre-SOX research reporting that participants in
similar roles tended to support biased reporting (Mayhew et al., 2001; Mayhew and Pike, 2004).
SOX Sec. 301 states that independent audit committee members will not accept any consulting,
advisory, or other compensatory fee from the company. However, in addition to this
conventional idea of independence, factors such as social ties with the CEO and compensation
parameters are likely to affect the audit committee’s monitoring behavior. Dey and Liu (2010)
examined whether an independent director’s past and present social connections and professional
similarities with the firm’s CEO are related to the functioning of the audit committee. They
reported that a change in audit committee composition to being fully independent is associated
with a significant increase in the quality of reporting and a significant decrease in the probability
of restatements. In contrast to the findings of Magilke et al. (2009), their results suggested that
when an audit committee's stock-based compensation increases, the quality of financial reporting
also increases. In another post-SOX archival study, MacGregor (2012) investigated the effects of
audit committee members’ equity holdings on financial reporting processes. He documented that
the influence of audit committee equity holdings on the likelihood that a firm meets the prior
year’s earnings level varies with the CEO’s equity incentives and the level of high-risk assets.
Collectively, his results suggested that equity holdings enhance audit committee effectiveness
and financial reporting quality. The only post-SOX analytical research that focused on audit
committee effectiveness and reporting quality was conducted by Caskey et al. (2010). In this
study, the authors modeled a reporting process that includes both manager and audit committee
and examined reporting quality and investors’ pricing effects. Their model showed how a
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manager privately reports earnings to an independent audit committee that, after its own due
diligence, modifies the report for public release to investors. The audit committee alters the
reporting and valuation dynamics by attempting to remove the manager’s reporting bias, but then
presents the information it has collected with its own bias. Table 2 summarizes post-SOX studies
that focused on audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality.
[Insert Table 2]
4.3 Earning Management and Accounting Frauds
Managements have incentives to manipulate earnings to achieve pre-determined
benchmarks or stockholders’ expectations. An independent and expert audit committee member
can help mitigate earnings management and misreporting. The link between earnings
management and audit committee members’ multiple directorships, social ties between the CEO
and audit committee members, and firms’ earnings manipulations are among the new issues
discussed in the post-SOX era.
In a frequently cited pre-SOX study, Klein (2002) highlighted the relationship between
audit committee independence and earning management. She found a negative relationship
between audit committee independence and abnormal accruals. By using pre-SOX data, Bedard
et al. (2004) documented that aggressive earning management is negatively related to the
financial and governance expertise of audit committees. In another pre-SOX study, Vafeas
(2005) argued that audit committee characteristics are related to earning quality in a manner that
is generally consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Srinivasan (2005) showed that
when companies experience accounting restatements, penalties for the audit committee members
from lawsuits and SEC actions are limited. However, audit committee members experience
16

significant labor market penalties. Farber (2005) documented that fraud firms have fewer audit
committee meetings and less financial expertise in the audit committee. Archambeault et al.
(2008) reported a positive association between both short-term and long-term stock option grants
for audit committee members and the likelihood of accounting restatements. Thus, researchers
have extensively investigated the issues of earnings management, restatement, and accounting
fraud by using pre-SOX data.
In Sec. 407(a) SOX states that every company must disclose whether or not the audit
committee has at least one ‘financial expert.’ In Sec. 407(b), SOX defines financial expert as a
person who has thorough education and experience as a public accountant, auditor, or principal
financial officer or is from a position involving an understanding of GAAP and financial
statements. Though neither SOX nor pre-SOX research addressed the issue of industry expertise,
in a post-SOX study, Cohen et al. (2010) found a significant negative association between
earning management and audit committee industry expertise. They argued that audit committee
members should have industry-specific expertise to evaluate the unique accounting judgments in
that industry. They showed that industry expertise combined with accounting or supervisory
financial expertise contributes to a lower likelihood of restatement.
By using post-SOX data, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) extended some pre-SOX studies.
Consistent with pre-SOX findings, they documented that audit committee accounting expertise is
positively associated with accruals quality, a commonly used proxy for earning management, and
this association is stronger when accounting expert audit committee members are independent,
hold fewer multiple directorships, and have lower tenure in their firms. However, supervisory
expertise has no impact on the effectiveness of audit committees. Given the significant increase
in the number of accounting experts serving on audit committees in the post-SOX period, these
17

findings highlight the narrowness of the SOX definition of expertise and the importance of
controlling expertise-specific characteristics.
While defining independence in Sec. 407(b), SOX mentions only economic ties between
the firm and audit committee members. However, the influence of the CEO through social ties
on audit committee members could hamper the committee’s independence, and this issue has
been investigated in post-SOX studies. For example, Cohen et al. (2011) showed that auditors
consider CEO influence over the audit committee’s independence when making difficult audit
judgments under varying risk scenarios with respect to management’s incentives to manage
earnings. The only analytical post-SOX study that has addressed the issue of earning
management and audit committee effectiveness was conducted by Laux and Laux (2009). In
their model, they showed that the magnitude of earning management in the firm depends on both
the CEO’s level of manipulation and the audit committee’s level of monitoring. They argued that
there is a positive spillover effect of the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation on
the audit committee’s incentive to engage in monitoring when the board’s responsibilities for
setting CEO pay (compensation committee) and monitoring (audit committee) are separated.
Table 3 offers a summary of the post-SOX audit committee research that has focused on earnings
management, earnings restatements, and accounting frauds.
[Insert Table 3]
4.4 Internal Control Weakness
According to SOX Sec. 302, managers must disclose all internal control problems. Sec.
404 states that managers must assess the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting
and that the attestation must be published in 10-Ks. Since the audit committee has power over
18

managers and auditors, it can play a central role in remediation of internal control problems. In
the pre-SOX period, it was difficult to determine the details of internal control weakness due to
the unavailability of data. Therefore, in the pre-SOX period, researchers had almost no interest in
the audit committee’s effectiveness or internal control problems. As SOX mandated the
disclosure of information, in the post-SOX period researchers have emphasized the investigation
of how audit committee expertise influences identification, disclosure, and remediation of
internal control weaknesses. Researchers have collected internal control disclosure data from 8Ks and 10-Ks, as mandated by SOX Sec. 302 and Sec. 404.
In the only pre-SOX study, conducted after SOX but using pre-SOX data, Krishnan
(2005) first addressed the issue of audit committee characteristics and their association with the
incidence of internal control problems. Although information on the quality of internal control
was not available in the pre-SOX period, companies that changed auditors were required to
disclose internal control problems pointed out by the predecessor auditors. In this study, the
author showed that independent and financial expert audit committees are significantly less
likely to be associated with the incidence of internal control problems.

By using post-SOX

data, Zhang et al. (2007) extended Krishnan’s (2005) investigation. They took advantage of the
detailed information on internal control unleashed by SOX and constructed a bigger sample of
firms with internal control problems from mandated disclosures in the firms’ 10-Q and 10-K
filings. They found that firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness if
their audit committees have less financial expertise, more specifically, less accounting financial
expertise. In another post-SOX study, Hoitash et al. (2009) documented that a lower likelihood
of disclosing Sec. 404 material weaknesses is associated with more audit committee members
who have accounting and supervisory experience. More specifically, they found that accounting
19

experts are associated with better control over processes directly related to financial reports,
while supervisory experts are associated with better control over management processes. They
also documented a positive association between number of audit committee meetings and
material weaknesses. This contradicts prior findings reporting that more frequent meetings have
a better impact (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Farber, 2006;
Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001). They argued that more frequent meetings may be a reaction
to the discovery of problems in internal controls, rather than increased diligence to ensure better
control over financial reporting.
Using post-SOX data, Goh (2009) focused on audit committee expertise and the
remediation of material weaknesses. He examined firms' timeliness in the remediation of
material weaknesses on the basis of how fast the firms receive a subsequent unqualified SOX
Sec. 404 opinion. The findings revealed that the proportion of audit committee members with
financial expertise is positively associated with firms' timeliness in the remediation of material
weaknesses. However, this result holds only for non-accounting financial expertise and not for
accounting financial expertise. He also documented that firms with larger audit committees are
more likely to take steps to remedy material weaknesses in a timely manner. Taken together, the
findings shed light on the efficacy of SOX with regard to the composition of the audit
committee. However, the study did not find a significant association between audit committee
independence and material weaknesses.
Naiker and Sharma (2009) investigated whether affiliated former audit firm employees
serving on the audit committee influence the quality of internal control. Though SOX does not
directly address the appointment of former audit firm employees to a client's board of directors,
the SEC imposes a three-year "cooling-off" period before a former audit firm employee is
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considered independent and able to serve on a client's board and subcommittee, including the
audit committee. Based on a sample of 1,225 firms making SOX Sec. 404 internal control
disclosures, Naiker and Sharma (2009) showed a negative relationship between internal control
deficiencies and the presence of former audit partners on the audit committee who are affiliated
and unaffiliated with the firm's external auditor. This result suggests that imposing restrictions
such as the three-year "cooling-off" period on appointing qualified and experienced experts
affiliated with former audit partners to the audit committee inhibits the SOX objective of
enhancing the audit committee's oversight of internal control over financial reporting; it also
suggests that there is no adverse "revolving-door" effect of former audit partners’ being
appointed to the audit committee. In another archival study, Johnstone et al. (2011) provided a
significant extension of contemporaneous research on internal control remediation, particularly
in terms of closely related studies by Goh (2009) and Li et al. (2010). However, unlike Goh
(2009), their results showed that improvement in audit committee influence, competence, and
incentives is positively associated with internal control material weakness remediation. Table 4
summarizes post-SOX audit committee studies that have focused on internal control problems.
[Insert Table 4]
4.5 Other Post-SOX Audit Committee Studies
Researchers have established that reporting quality is positively associated with audit
committees’ accounting financial expertise. However, even after SOX implementation, most
audit committee financial experts have non-accounting financial expertise (DeFond et al., 2005;
Davidson et al., 2004). Using post-SOX data, Krishnan and Lee (2009) examined the
determinants of firms’ choices of accounting and non-accounting financial experts on audit
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committees. They found that firms with higher litigation risks are more likely to have accounting
financial experts on their audit committee. In a post-SOX study, Beasley et al. (2009) provided
extensive information about the audit committee oversight process obtained from in-depth
interviews of 42 individuals actively serving on audit committees. In their survey, the authors
found that audit committee members strive to provide effective monitoring of financial reporting
and seek to avoid serving on ceremonial audit committees. They also found that many responses
varied with time of appointment (pre-SOX versus post-SOX) of the audit committee members.
Defond et al. (2005) investigated market reactions to the appointment of financial expert
audit committee members. Because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial
experts narrowly to just include accounting financial experts (as initially proposed) or more
broadly to include non-accounting financial experts (as ultimately passed), Defond et al. (2005)
separately examined the appointments of each type of expert. They found a positive market
reaction (three-day cumulative abnormal returns) to the appointment of accounting financial
experts to the audit committee but no reaction to the appointment of non-accounting financial
experts. Davidson et al. (2004) conducted a similar study and documented a positive stock price
reaction when new members of the audit committee have more financial expertise. In another
post-SOX study, Ronen and Berman (2004) argued that although SOX significantly enhances the
role of audit committees it fails to address the major financial scandal problems, such as agency
cost and management entrenchment. In their survey study, they argued that audit committee
members’ independence is just a myth since regulatory mechanisms impose penalties ex-post,
and ex-post mechanisms are nowhere as effective as ex-ante mechanisms.
After implementation of SOX, researchers addressed some new issues, such as how
earnings forecasts, cost of debt, and interactions among different committees are linked to audit
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committee composition criteria. However, several researchers used pre-SOX data while
investigating these new issues. For example, by using pre-SOX data, Dey (2008) showed that
firms with a higher level of agency conflicts have higher audit committee independence and
expertise. By using pre-SOX data, Gendron and Bedard (2006) documented that audit committee
effectiveness depends on the background of audit committee members, ceremonial features of
audit committee meetings, and reflective interpretations of substantive practices and activities
taking place during the meetings. DeZoort (2008) argued that experienced audit committee
members make more consistent judgments and provide more technical content in reporting.
Vafeas (2001) explained how the likelihood of audit committee appointment increases with the
degree of outside director independence and decreases with compensation committee
membership and length of board tenure. Beasley and Salterio (2002) reported that inclusion of
more outside directors on the audit committee than the mandated minimum is associated with a
larger and more independent board. In another study, by using pre-SOX data, Karamanou and
Vafeas (2005) found that firms with effective audit committees are more likely to make or
update earnings forecasts; their forecasts are also more accurate and elicit a more favorable
market response. Anderson et al. (2004) found that fully independent audit committees are
associated with a significantly lower cost of debt financing. Thus, after the implementation of
SOX, researchers expanded the literature addressing new issues derived from SOX. However, in
most cases the authors used pre-SOX data. Even so, one can assume that the findings would not
differ significantly if the authors of those studies had used post-SOX data. Table 5 summarizes
other post-SOX audit committee studies that are not discussed in previous sections.
[Insert Table 5]
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5.0 Concluding Remarks
Overall, the audit committee literature is extensive and contributes an enormous body of
knowledge. The arguments and findings established by the pre- and post-SOX researchers are
reasonably consistent. However, in the post-SOX period, researchers have investigated new
research issues that are mostly driven by SOX. These issues include the role of the audit
committee in the firm’s internal control weaknesses, the role of financial accounting expert audit
committee members in limiting misreporting, and market reactions to the appointment of expert
audit committee members, among others. This literature review examines the conjecture,
documented in both the pre- and post-SOX eras, that audit committee independence and
expertise increase audit committee effectiveness. However, the definitions of independence and
expertise given in SOX are narrow and insufficient to accomplish the goals of the oversight
process. The SEC has published its own rule that defines audit committee expertise in a more
elaborate manner. In the post-SOX era, researchers have differentiated the types of expertise and
demonstrated how different expertise (e.g., financial, supervisory, accounting, non-accounting,
industry) differently affect the audit committee’s monitoring process. These studies have
reported that type of expertise matters in audit committees’ oversight process, which implies a
limitation of SOX regarding the definition of audit committee expertise. Further studies may
address how the expertise and independence of audit committees differ in regulated versus
unregulated industries.
The relevant dominance of archival and experimental research in the post-SOX era
suggests the need for more theoretical approaches that strengthen the underlying assumptions of
audit committee composition and the committee’s effectiveness with regard to the monitoring
process. Another potential area of future research is audit committee compensation criteria.
24

Though in post-SOX literature, researchers have addressed how different forms of compensation
affect audit committees’ monitoring processes, the findings are inconclusive. Future research
should focus on how compensation interacts with other attributes of audit committees and what
forms of compensation interact with independence and expertise to make audit committees most
effective.
The audit committee is an effective corporate governance mechanism. However, the
power of the audit committee can be affected by other governance players, such as the board of
directors and institutional investors. Future studies should highlight how the audit committee
interacts with the board of directors and acts as a complement to the governance process. Since
the board empowers and selects the audit committee, strong board support is a requisite for audit
committee effectiveness. Researchers can inspect how the audit committee’s reliance on the
board varies and how it is associated with the audit committee’s monitoring process. Another
future research area might be the interactions between management and the audit committee in
the post-SOX environment. Since it is difficult to observe management-audit committee
interaction, controlled experiments may help to investigate how SOX requirements increase audit
committee activities in terms of audit committee interaction with required parties. Future
research can investigate whether the ability to attract competent and expert audit committee
members varies with company characteristics such as company reputation, size, agency conflicts,
and audit committee compensation policy, among others. Future research can also examine how
other regulatory reforms interact with SOX and influence audit committee effectiveness.
Although in the post-SOX era researchers have extended the audit committee literature,
the generalizability of post-SOX audit committee research needs to be assessed. Almost all
studies have been conducted in the U.S. context. Future research should focus on international
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settings to investigate whether the findings hold where different regulatory requirements like
SOX are in effect. In such settings, one can examine whether cultural and economic differences
affect audit committee composition and effectiveness or whether the findings vary due to actspecific criteria. Last, but not least, this study suggests the need to investigate two fundamental
questions: To what extent is SOX successful in empowering audit committees? Is the role of the
audit committee a myth, as claimed by some researchers?
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Exhibit 1
Timeline of Audit Committee Research:

SOX enacted
Pre-SOX Literature

Post-SOX Literature
July 30, 2002

After 2002

After 2002

(Pre-SOX data)

(Post-SOX data)

Before 2002
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Exhibit 2
Classification of Post-SOX Audit Committee Research

Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature

Internal and External
Audit Quality
1) Audit committee
Composition

Financial Reporting
Process Quality
1) Audit committee
Composition

a) Independence (+)

a) Independence (+)

b) Expertise (+)

b) Expertise (+)

2) Multiple
directorships (-)
3) Audit Committee
Compensation (+)
4) Audit Committee
Effectiveness (+)

Internal Control

Less Earnings
Management

1) Audit committee
Expertise

1) Audit committee
Composition

a) Accounting
expertise (+)

2) Audit Committee
Compensation
a) Cash (?)

2) Audit Committee
Affiliations (-)

b) Equity (+)
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1) Audit committee
Expertise (+)

a) Independence (+)
b) Expertise (+)

b) Supervisory
expertise (?)

Other (litigation risk,
market reaction)

2) Audit Committee
Effectiveness (+)

2) Audit Committee
Oversight Process (+)

Exhibit 3

Effectiveness / outputs of audit committees’ monitoring process

Determinants / inputs of audit committees’ monitoring Process

The SOX Act and the Domain of Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature
Audit Committee
Definition: SEC 2. a

Composition

Responsibilities

Compensation

1. Independence

1. Oversee financial

1. Cash

SEC 301. 3

reporting process

2. Stock based

SEC 2, 202
2. Expertise
SEC 407

2. Audit procedure

Not addressed in
SOX

SEC 301.2, 3, 4, 5, 6

Monitoring

Auditors

Managements

Internal Auditing

Financial Reporting

External Auditing

Process

Earning
management
Exhibit
4
Internal Control deficiencies
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Exhibit 4
Selected Post-SOX Audit Committee Studies
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Auditing and Finance
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Hann and Hu (2005), Journal of Accounting Research
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decisions and investors preferences” Gaynor, McDaniel and Neal (2006), The Accounting
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and Zhou (2007), Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
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Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
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Contemporary Accounting Research
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Table 1: Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature focusing on Auditing

Time
period

Dependent
variable

Independent
variable

88 Audit
committee
members

2004 2005

Agreement
with auditor
proposed
adjustments

Audit Issue,
Director status

Audit committee members are less
likely to accept auditor's
restatement recommendation than
adjustment recommendations.
Directors with multiple
directorships are less willing to
support restatements due to the
potential adverse effects on their
reputation.

N/A

77 Business
professionals

2004 2005

Audit
committee
members'
comfort

Audit
committee
members'
knowledge

Audit committee members
investigate more extensively as
accounting decisions become
increasingly aggressive and audit
committee members with
accounting experience are
particularly through their
investigations

Sample does not
consist completely
of corporate
directors, binary

Good audit committee and internal
audit are complement not
substitute for monitoring external
auditors

Future research
can test whether
the audit fee
model applies to

Authors

Journal

Domain

Method

Sample

Hunton
and Rose
(2008)

AOS

Auditor's
recommendatio
n and multiple
directorship

Experiment

Pomeroy
(2010)

Auditing

Auditor –
management
negotiation for
accounting
decisions and
audit
committee's
expertise

Experiment

Complement of
auditing and
audit committee
effectiveness

Archival

Vermeer,
Raghunan
dan and
Forgione
(2009)

Auditing

125 largest
non-profit
organization

2003

Audit fees

Donation, debt,
size, asset, audit
committee
independence

Results

Limitations /
Future research

variable to examine

experience may
be criticized as
subjective

smaller non-profits

38

Authors

Journal

Domain

Method

Sample

Engel,
Hayes and
Wang
(2010)

JAE

Audit fees and
audit
committee's
compensation

Archival

Random firm
ExecuComp
(3,295 firmyear)

Time
period

Dependent
variable

Independent
variable

20002004

Audit
committee
compensatio
n (cash,
stock, fees,
option)

Audit fees,
meeting,
expertise, size,
leverage

Results

Limitations /
Future research

Total compensation and cash
retainers paid to audit committees
are positively correlated with audit
fees and the impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley

Future research –
how compensation
incentives interact
with reputation
incentives to
impact effectiveness

of the audit
committees in
monitoring
financial reporting.

Gaynor,
McDaniel
and Neal
(2006)

TAR

Audit and nonaudit service

Experiment

100 corporate
directors

2003

Whether
Audit
committee
members
provide nonaudit service

39

Joint provision
of non-audit
will improve
audit quality,
disclosure

The pre-approval decision for joint
(audit & non-audit) service
provision is influenced by whether
the audit committee believes audit
quality improves. Audit
committees are less likely to
approve joint service provision
when public disclosures are
required.

Future research
could be to
examine the types
of risks audit
committees view
as associated with
fees disclosure.

Time
period

Dependent
variable

Independent
variable

Journal

Domain

Method

Sample

Cohen,
Krishnam
oorthy and
Wright
(2010)

CAR

Audit
committee
effectiveness

Semistructured
survey based
experiment

30
experienced
audit partners
and manages

2006

N/A

N/A

Corporate governance environment
has improved considerably in the
post-SOX era with audit
committees that are substantially
more active, diligent,
knowledgeable, and powerful.

Future research
can examine how
the litigation
regime in various
countries
potentially affects
the role that audit
committees play

Norman,
Rose and
Suh
(2011)

AOS

Audit
committee
expertise

Experiment

73 Chief
Audit
Executives
and deputy
Chief Audit
Executives

2006

N/A

N/A

The results do not indicate that
increased audit committee
expertise and associated increases
in audit committee members’
perceived powers cause internal
auditors to be less willing to waive
misstatements.

N/A

Bierstaker,
Cohen,
DeZoort
and
Hermanson
(2012)

Auditing

Audit
committee
compensation
and accounting
disagreement

Experiment

56 public
company
audit
committee
members

N/A

Whether
audit
committee
members
support for
the auditor /
management
in accounting
disagreement

Short term
compensation,
long term
compensation,
fairness, no. of
years served in
the committee,

Audit committee members are
more likely to support the auditor
in an accounting disagreement
when audit committee
compensation includes long-term
stock options and when members
perceive that the failure to record
the auditor’s adjustment is less fair
to shareholders.

Future study
should look which
component of
fairness explain
committee
member’s decision
to support/oppose

40

Results

Limitations /
Future research

Authors

auditor management

negotiations.

Dependent
variable

Independent
variable

Journal

Domain

Method

Schondube

JAPP

Reputation
concerns and
herd behavior
of audit
committee

Modeling

BrownLiburd
and
Wright
(2011)

Auditing

Past client
relationship

Experiment

42 audit
managers and
21 audit
partners

N/A

How
extreme
auditor’s
first offer is,
as compared
to preferred
write-down

Audit
committee
strength, past
negotiation
relationship

Auditors are contending when both
the audit committee is strong and
the past relationship is contending.

Baura,
Rama and
Sharma
(2010)

JAPP

Audit
committee
expertise

Archival

181 firms

2001 2003

Log of the
internal
audit budget

Total assets,
debt, inventory,
operating cash
flow, audit fees,
restatement, no.
of audit
committee
member, tenure
and expertise of
audit committee

The investment in internal auditing
is negatively related to the
presence of auditing experts on the
committee and the average tenure
of audit committee members, but
positively related to the number of
audit committee meetings (a proxy
for audit committee diligence).

-Pirchegger
and
Schondube
(2011)

Sample

Time
period

Authors

Results

A herding equilibrium exists in
which the audit committee
‘‘herds’’ and follows the auditor’s
judgment no matter what its own
insights suggest.

41

Limitations /
Future research

N/A

Future research
can examine the
extent to which
auditors are
adaptive in the
choice of
negotiation.

Table 2: Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature focusing on Financial Reporting Quality

Authors

Journal

Domain

Method

Sample

Kelton and
Yang
(2008)

JAPP

Internet
Financial
Reporting and
Audit
committee
Expertise,
audit
committee
diligence

Archival

284 firms
listed in
NASDAQ

Caskey,
Nagar and
Petacchi
(2010)

TAR

Financial
Reporting
bias of Audit
committee

Modeling

Magilke,
Mayhew
and Pike
(2009)

TAR

Financial
Reporting
bias and
Audit
committee
stock
compensation

Experiment

Time
period

Dependent
variables

Independent
variables

2003

Content,
presentation
format,
governance
disclosure

Governance
index,
financial
expertise,
number of
meetings

Results

Limitations / Future
research

Firms with a diligent audit
committee and a higher
percentage of audit
committee members with
financial expertise are more
likely to engage in Internet
financial reporting which
reflects reporting quality and
disclosure transparency

Future research could
examine whether
different audit
committee expertise are
also associated with
various criteria of IFR,
such as information
quality and reporting
frequency.

From audit committee's
perspective, the manager's
financial reporting bias is a
source of noise. The audit
committee attempts to
remove this noise, but then
presents its report with its
own bias.
Student
participants

2005

Current or
Future stock
based
compensation

42

Reporting
accuracy,
bonus paid to
committee

Audit committee members
compensated with current
stock-based compensation
prefer aggressive reporting
and audit committee members
compensated with future
stock-based compensation
prefer overly conservative
reporting

N/A

The major limitationaudit committees make
decisions as a group not
as individual, they
suppress liability-based
incentives and the
interaction between
committee and auditor

Time
period

Dependent
variables

Independent
variables

210 firms,
2,238 firm
year, 20,791
director year

1996 2006

ROA, Excess
return,
accrual
quality,
restatement
or not

Investment
by CEO,
size, return,
operating
volatility,
independent
director

Firms with increases in
independent audit committee
directors with social and
professional connections to
the firm's CEO are associated
with lower operating
performance and poorer
financial reporting quality.
Financial reporting quality
increases with audit
committee's stock based
compensation.

The study cannot
completely mimic SOX
definition of audit
committee
independence due to
data limitations

Archival

Random firm
ExecuComp
(3,295 firmyear)

20002004

Audit
committee
compensation
(cash, stock,
fees, option)

Audit fees,
meeting,
expertise,
size,
leverage

There is positive relation
between audit committee
compensation and the
demand for monitoring of the
financial reporting process.
Total compensation and cash
retainers paid to audit
committees are positively
correlated with audit fees.

Future research can
investigate how
compensation
incentives interact with
reputation incentives to
impact the effectiveness
of the audit committees
in monitoring financial
reporting.

Archival

1370 and
2389 firmobservations
for two sets
of analysis

2000 2003

Meet
earnings
threshold

Audit
committee

Equity holdings enhance
audit committee effectiveness
by increasing a committee’s
responsiveness to risk factors.

Future studies - how
social relation between
audit committee and
executives influence
committee’s decisions.

Authors

Journal

Domain

Method

Sample

Dey and
Liu (2010)

Working
Paper

Financial
Reporting
quality and
Audit
committee
Independence
and
Compensation

Archival

Engel,
Hayes and
Wang
(2010)

JAE

Audit fees
and audit
committee's
compensation

MacGregor
(2012)

JAAP

Audit
committee
incentives and
achievement
of earnings
threshold

equity holding,

size, tenure,
interaction
terms

43

Results

Limitations / Future
research

Table 3: Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature focusing on Earning Management and Accounting Frauds

Authors

Journal

Domain

Method

Laux and
Laux
(2009)

TAR

Audit
committee
effectiveness

Modeling

Cohen,
Gaynor,
Krishnamo
orthy and
Wright
(2011)

Auditing

CEO
influence on
Audit
committee

Experime
ntal

Cohen,
Hoitash,
Krishnamo
orthry and
Wright
(2010)

Working
Paper

Audit
Committee
Industry
Expertise

Archival

Sample

65
auditors

606 public
limited
firms,
2,584
audit
committee
members

Time
period

2008

2005

Dependent
variable

Audit
adjustment

Company
announces
financial
restatements

44

Independent
variable

Results

Limitations / Future
research

The increase in CEO equity incentives
does not necessarily lead to a higher
level of earning management because
the audit committee will adjust its
oversight effort in response to a
change in CEO incentives.

N/A

CEO influence
on audit
committee
independence
(high vs. low)

When management's incentives for
earning management are high,
auditors are less likely to waive as
much of an adjustments when the
CEO has less influence over the audit
committee's independence than when
the CEO's influence is greater.

Future study could
examine how auditors

Industry
expert,
financial
expert, size of
committee,
independence,
board criteria

A significant lower likelihood of
restatement is found when the audit
committee has an industry expert.
Both industry expertise and
accounting or supervisory financial
expertise contributes to lower
likelihood of restatement.

Future research can
employ experimental
methods to determine
the accounting issues
and risk assessments
that would benefit
from audit committee
industry expertise

trade-off audit committee

independence and
financial as well as
industry expertise in
resolving difficult
reporting issues

Authors

Journal

Domain

Method

Dhaliwal,
Naiker and
Navissi
(2010)

CAR

Accruals
quality and
Audit
committee
expertise and
independence

Archival

Sample

Time
period

Dependent
variable

Independent
variable

2004 2006

Accrual
quality

Accounting
expertise, non
accounting
expertise,
independence,
multiple
directorship

45

Results

A positive relationship exists between
accruals quality and audit committee
accounting experts who are
independent, hold fewer multiple
directorship and have lower tenure in
their firms. The most positive effect of
accounting expertise is achieved when
it is combined with finance expertise
whereas supervisory expertise has no
incremental impact on committee's
effectiveness.

Limitations / Future
research

Limitations – the study
rely on the historical
employment data of
directors disclosed by
firms. The results may
be biased by the extent
of historical employment
coverage. The accruals
quality may be affected

by other requirements
of SOX during the
sample period.

Table 4: Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature focusing on Internal Control Weakness

Authors

Journal

Goh

CAR

(2009)

Domain

Method

Sample

Time
period

Dependent
variables

Independent
variables

Remediation

Archival

208 firms

2003 -

Firms

Independence,

Positive relation is found

The sample in this

of material

with

2004

remediates

expertise, size

between non-accounting

study comprises

weaknesses
and Audit

Material
Weakness

MW with
first /

of committee,
no. of

financial expertise and
timeliness in the redemption

firms with material
weaknesses and

second
SOX 404

meeting,
board criteria

of material weaknesses. Firms
with larger audit committees

may thus be biased
in favor of firms

are more likely to remediate
material weaknesses in a

with relatively
ineffective audit

timely manner.

committees.

committee
Expertise

Zhang,
Zhou and
Zhou
(2007)

JAPP

Audit
committee
Financial
Expertise

Archival

208 firms
with
Material
Weakness

2004

Results

Conditional
probability

Expertise,
Independence,

Firms are more likely to be
identified with an internal

of internal
control

auditor,
acquisition,

control weakness, if audit
committees have less financial

weaknesses

restructure

expertise or, have less
accounting financial expertise
and non-accounting financial
expertise. They are more
likely to be identified with an
internal control weakness, if
the audit committee members
are more independent.

46

Limitations /
Future Research

N/A

Authors

Journal

Hoitash,
Hoitash

TAR

Domain

Method

Sample

Time
period

Dependent
variables

Independent
variables

Disclosure
of material

Archival

5,480 firm
year,

2004 2006

Disclosure
of material

Financial and
supervisory

Lower likelihood of
disclosing 404 material

They assess the
association of audit

weaknesses

expertise,
committee

weaknesses is associated with
relatively more audit

committee expertise
with internal

size, meeting,
board

committee members having
accounting and supervisory

control in two years
after implementation

experience. The nature of

of SOX. Future

material weaknesses varies
with the type of experience. A

research should
investigate it in

positive association exists
between the number of audit

subsequent
periods, as

committee meetings and
material weaknesses.

companies take
time to adapt

and
Bedard

weakness
and Audit

19,673
audit

(2009)

committee
Experience

committee
members

Results

Limitations /
Future Research

regulatory change.
Naiker

TAR

Audit

and

committee

Sharma
(2009)

affiliation

Archival

1,225
firms

2004

Disclosure

Audit

A negative relation exists

Due to lack of

of internal

committee

between internal control

data, they are

control
deficiencies

affiliation
with past

deficiencies and presence of
former audit partners on the

unable to test
whether former

/current
auditor,

committee who are affiliated
and unaffiliated with firm's

audit partners who
actually worked on

expertise,
independence,

external auditor. Imposing
restrictions of three years

the audit of a client
are as effective as

meeting, size

"cooling-off" rule inhibits

former audit

SOX’s objective to appoint
expert committee members.

partners who have
not worked on the
audit of the client.

47

Authors

Journal

Johnstone,
Li and

CAR

Rupley
(2011)

Domain

Method

Sample

Audit
committee

Archival

868 firms

effectiveness

Time
period

Dependent
variables

Independent
variables

2004 2007

Internal
control

Audit
committee and

Improvements in audit
committee influence,

Limitations - there
is a possibility

remediation

board
members

competence and incentives are
each positively associated

that ICMW
remediation and

turnover,

with internal control material

changes in

change in firm
characteristics,

weaknesses remediation.

governance factors
may be

48

Results

Limitations /
Future Research

nature and
extent of

simultaneously
driven by other

internal control
problem

factors.

Table 5: Other Post-SOX Audit Committee Literature

Authors

Krishnan

Journal

Auditing

Domain

Litigation

Method

Archival

Sample

Fortune

Time

Dependent

Independent

period

variables

variables

2004

1000 firms

Results

Limitations /
Future Research

Financial

Litigation risk,

Firms with higher litigation

Limitations – the

expert on

governance

risk are more likely to have

sample consists of

and Lee

risk and

(2009)

Audit

audit

index, , board

accounting financial experts

Fortune 1000

committee

committee

size, holding by

on their audit committee.

companies. So the

institutional

However, the association

results may not be

independence,

between litigation risk and

generalizable to

the likelihood of appointing

the population of

accounting financial experts

other firms.

Expertise

occurs for firms with strong
governance but not for those
with weak governance.

Defond,

JAR

Market

Archival

509 firms

Hann and

reaction &

and 702

Hu (2005)

audit

audit

committee

committee

expertise

members

49

2002

Three-days

Financial

Positive market reaction

cumulative

expertise of

exists between appointment

audit

of accounting financial

committee,

experts to audit committee

other

but no reaction to non-

governance

accounting financial experts

attributes

assigned to audit committee

abnormal
returns

N/A

Authors

Beasley,

Journal

CAR

Domain

Audit

Method

Survey

Sample

Time

Dependent

Independent

period

variables

variables

Results

Limitations /
Future Research

42 Audit

2004 -

Many audit committee

Future research

2005

members strive to provide

could be to find

effective monitoring of

what factors

financial reporting and seek

improves audit

to avoid serving on

committee’s ability

ceremonial audit committees.

to identify and

Carcello,

Committee

committee

Hermanson

oversight

members

and Neal

process

(2009)

respond to high
risk fraud condition.

Ronen and

JAAF

SOX and

Descriptive

2003

Audit committee member’s

Berman

audit

independence is a myth

(2004)

committee

which cannot be easily made

effectiveness

to happen. SOX has failed to
address the major financial
scandal problem - such as
agency cost and management
entrenchment problem,

50

N/A

